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Income Inequality and the Oil Resource Curse 
                                                        
       
      Abstract  
Surprisingly, there has been little research conducted about the cross-country relationship between oil 
dependence/abundance and income inequality. At the same time, there is some tentative evidence 
suggesting that oil rich nations tend to under-report data on income inequality, which can potentially 
influence the estimated empirical relationships between oil richness and income inequality. In this paper 
we contribute to the literature in a twofold manner. First, we explore in depth the empirical 
relationship between oil and income inequality by making use of the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database – the most comprehensive dataset on income inequality providing comparable 
data for the broadest set of country-year observations. Second, this is the first study to our knowledge 
that adopts an empirical framework to examine whether oil rich nations tend to under-report data on 
income inequality and the possible implications thereof. We make use of Heckman selection models to 
validate the tendency of oil rich countries to under-report and correct for the bias that might arise as a 
result of this – we find that oil is associated with lower income inequality with the exception of the 
very oil-rich economies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years there has been a fast expanding literature researching the links between resource 
abundance and several measures of economic performance. Much of the so-called resource curse 
literature has developed theoretical and empirical research explaining the negative correlation 
observed between several measures of mineral abundance and long-term economic growth (Andersen 
and Aslaksen, 2008; Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2010; Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010; Caselli and 
Cunningham, 2009; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006; Kolstad, 2009; Murshed and Serino, 2011; Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh, 2004, 2007; Papyrakis, 2011, 2014; Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 
2001). Much of this literature (to which this paper belongs) pays particular attention to oil and its 
correlates (e.g. for the case of conflict, see Lujala, 2010, gender inequality, see Ross, 2008, 
bureaucratic efficiency, see Goldberg et al., 2008). 
 Several explanations of the underperformance of oil rich economies have been provided in the 
literature. A first stream of the literature has focused on political economy explanations associating 
oil with the presence of inferior institutions and rent-seeking competition (Bjorvatn and Naghavi, 
2011; Bjorvatn and Selvik, 2008; Bulte et al., 2005; Dalmazzo and De Blasio, 2003; Papyrakis et al., 
2016; Torvik, 2002; Wick and Bulte, 2006). Competition for natural resource rents might also link to 
violent conflict, particularly in the case of ethnically fragmented societies (see Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte, 2009; Dixon, 2009; Olsson, 2007). A second branch of the literature looks at Dutch Disease 
explanations of poor economic performance (Beine et al., 2010; Cherif, 2013; Corden, 1984; Corden and 
Neary, 1982; Pegg, 2010; Papyrakis and Raveh, 2014; Torvik, 2002). In this context, mineral exports can 
be associated with both a relocation of production factors from various sectors towards the mineral sector 
as a result of wage premia in the latter (i.e. the so-called resource movement effect), as well as 
inflationary pressures and loss of competitiveness in exporting industries (i.e. the so-called spending 
effect).   
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 While the resource curse literature initially focused attention on economic growth, it gradually 
broadened its scope to other development variables. For example, Bulte et al. (2005) and Daniele (2011) 
demonstrated that mineral resource dependence is associated with lower values of the Human 
Development Index (a composite development index of life expectancy, education and GDP per capita), 
undernourishment, higher child mortality and limited access to safe water. Ross (2008) claimed that oil 
dependence is associated with gender inequality measured by reduced female political representation and 
labour participation. Mineral-rich countries are also expected to be characterised by lower genuine 
savings (i.e. net total investment in physical, natural and human capital), that is often used as a measure 
of long-term (weak) sustainability (assuming that different forms of capital are perfectly substitutable, 
see Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003; Boos and Holm-Müller, 2012; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007). There is 
also some tentative evidence of a poor empirical track record of poverty alleviation in mineral dependent 
economies (see Pegg, 2006). 
 Surprisingly, though, there has been little research conducted about the relationship between oil 
dependence/abundance and income inequality. Oil rents can, in principle, link to lower income inequality 
if they encourage redistribution that favours low-income groups. On the other hand, they might relate to 
greater income inequality if they become concentrated in the hands of political elites or geographical 
regions (we expand on this further in Section 2). In this paper we contribute to this strand of the 
literature in a twofold manner. First, we explore in depth the empirical relationship between oil 
abundance/dependence and income inequality by making use of the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID) developed by Solt (2009). This is the most comprehensive dataset on 
income inequality providing comparable data for the broadest set of country-year observations. While 
our primary focus is to shed light on the links between oil and income inequality, our empirical 
specifications also control for other variables that have been found to influence income inequality in 
the literature. Second, this is the first study to our knowledge that adopts an empirical framework to 
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examine whether oil rich nations tend to under-report data on income inequality and the possible 
implications thereof. We make use of Heckman selection models to validate the tendency of oil rich 
countries to under-report and correct for the bias that might arise as a result of this – we find that oil 
is associated with lower income inequality with the exception of the very oil-dependent economies. 
 The next section is devoted to the theoretical mechanisms that link income inequality to the 
presence of oil, as well as other possible explanatory factors. In the same section, we also discuss how 
oil dependence/abundance and other factors can influence the reporting behaviour of countries 
(regarding data on income inequality). The theoretical section will provide the justification behind the 
empirical specifications that are tested in subsequent sections. Section 3 presents our empirical 
analysis on income inequality and oil abundance. Section 4 focuses on the under-reporting behaviour 
of oil rich nations and presents a series of Heckman selection models that allow to correct for the bias 
that might arise from such under-reporting. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. INEQUALITY AND OIL: THE THEORY 
In this section we discuss the theoretical mechanisms that are likely to link income inequality to the 
presence of oil, as well as other possible explanatory factors. We also comment on how these 
variables may not only relate to the level of income inequality, but also to the reporting of income 
inequality. The theoretical mechanisms presented will then shape the specifications that will be 
empirically tested in Sections 3 and 4 of the paper.  
 
Oil 
 Oil rents may, in principle, be associated with lower income inequality if the revenues become 
redistributed equitably and possibly target lower income groups. On the other hand, an expansive oil 
sector may relate to greater income inequality by reducing production in the non-oil economy via Dutch 
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Disease effects, by inducing rent-seeking behaviour and disproportionately benefiting specific interest 
groups (particularly in ethnically fragmented societies, see Fum and Hodler, 2010) and/or disadvantaging 
the oil-scarce regions within the country (Ross, 2007). Gylfason and Zoega (2003) mention that 
resource abundance may correlate positively with income inequality when the distribution of natural 
capital is more unequal compared to other forms of capital in the economy. In an earlier paper, Leamer 
et al. (1999) suggest that the availability of natural resources (primarily land) relates to lower human 
capital accumulation, a diversion of physical capital away from manufacturing and higher levels of 
income inequality. 
 Ross (2007) claims that the Gini coefficient (the typical measure of income inequality) tends to be 
uncorrelated with mineral dependence, although he acknowledges that this might be driven by a sample 
bias. He claims that mineral rich nations tend to under-report data on income inequality, which can 
potentially influence the estimated empirical relationships between mineral dependence and income 
inequality (Ross, 2007). Williams (2011) suggests that governments in oil rich countries generally lack 
transparency and are reluctant to reveal sensitive information related to income inequality. Several 
other papers in the literature also suggest that oil-rich countries suffer from limited transparency (e.g. 
in terms of disclosing fiscal information; see de Renzio, 2009; O’Lear, 2011; Kalyuzhnova, 2011) – a 
phenomenon which could possibly also extend to the provision of inequality-related information. In 
oil rich nations there is generally lower dependence on taxes and heavier reliance on resource rents, 
which possibly reduces citizen demand for government accountability and transparency (e.g. see 
Ross, 2001; Sandbu, 2006). 
 
Income per Capita 
 Some scholars hypothesise that richer countries are characterised by more equal income 
distributions, given their increased capacity for redistribution and relative prominence of the more 
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labour-intensive service sector (Choi, 2006; Ravallion, 2010). The demand for egalitarian policies 
that place constraints on government behaviour and redistribute wealth away from political elites can 
also increase at higher income levels (Robinson and Acemoglu, 2002). Alternatively, poorer 
economies may suffer less from income inequality given the relative even distribution of income in 
predominantly agrarian societies. A non-linear relationship (where inequality first increases as 
income rises, but then falls for subsequently high levels of income; often referred to as the Kuznets 
curve) can also be possible as a result of the structural transformation of economies at different stages 
of development (with possibly higher levels of inequality at intermediate levels of GDP per capita, 
when the economy begins to industrialise; see Barro, 2000). 
 Income levels may also be associated with the extent of reporting inequality data. Other things 
equal, richer economies are likely to have better equipped administrations and statistical agencies to 
frequently collect and report data (on inequality, as well as other variables; see Williams, 2011). 
Furthermore, there are many empirical studies that demonstrate that the level of economic 
development is positively associated with several institutional/governance variables that are likely to 
matter for the release of information – e.g. richer nations tend to be more accountable to their 
electorates and are characterised by a more transparent public bureaucracy (see Goel and Ram, 2013; 
Paldam, 2002). 
 
Institutions 
 Good institutions that support government accountability are likely to correlate with lower income 
inequality. Lee (2005) claims that fully institutionalised democracies are characterised by lower income 
inequality as a result of successful targeted redistribution – “democratic political mechanisms enable 
state institutions to be more responsive to the demands of the lower classes and more committed to 
achieving better distributional outcomes”. In more authoritarian regimes, governments may use the 
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public sector and fiscal mechanisms to selectively support industries and lobby groups with vested 
interests in government policies. Democratic institutions support the establishment of trade unions and 
political parties that represent the lower and middle classes and the expansion of suffrage has been 
historically associated with decreases in income inequality (see Reuveny and Li, 2003). 
 Strong democratic institutions may also correlate positively with the tendency to report data on 
income inequality. Williams (2009; 2011) claims, for instance, that good institutions that place 
constraints on the executive branch of the government are associated with higher levels of transparency 
and a higher flow of information released to the public by the government. 
 
Agriculture 
 One might expect a negative correlation between agriculture and income inequality to the extent that 
income is more equally distributed across agrarian economies (e.g. see Andres and Ramlogan-Dobson, 
2011; Chong, 2004). Particularly in the developing world, agriculture tends to be rather labour-intensive, 
with agricultural income distributed more equally across the population compared to income accruing 
from other sectors.   
 Could agriculture also play a role in terms of explaining variation in reporting behaviour across 
countries? Williams (2009) finds that countries that rely on agriculture tend to release more information 
to the public (while the opposite holds for the countries that rely on minerals). Bulte et al. (2005) also 
find a positive statistical relationship between agriculture and government effectiveness (with the latter 
capturing the overall quality of the civil service, which is likely to be closely associated with an adequate 
provision of information by the public administration). For this reason, we include agriculture as a 
control variable when we attempt to explain the variation in reporting behaviour across countries. 
 
Ethnic Fractionalisation 
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 Ethnic heterogeneity might relate to greater income inequality as a result of competitive rent-
seeking across ethnic groups and selective redistributive government policies (Easterly and Levine, 
1997; Milanovic, 2003). In general, people might be more averse to redistributive policies in places of 
higher ethnic diversity (Clarke et al., 2006).  
 The correlation between ethnic fractionalisation and the extent of data reporting (on inequality) is 
of an ambiguous sign. Fractionalised economies may be less transparent, particularly in the case of 
disclosing sensitive information that are likely to reveal the extent of (ethnically-based) income 
inequality (see Mauro, 1995). On the other hand, there is some contradicting evidence suggesting that 
governments in mineral-rich countries may actually make a concerted effort to improve transparency 
in the presence of an ethnically fractionalised population, in order to tackle mineral-induced rent-
seeking (and for example, as a result of this, they are more likely to participate in the Extractive 
Industry Transparency Initiative that aims at improving transparency in the extractive sector, see 
Pitlik et al., 2010). 
 
Trade Openness 
 The relationship between trade openness and income inequality is also ambiguous. Several 
theoretical papers suggest that trade openness and globalisation may either associate positively 
(Monfort and Nicolini, 2000; Paluzie, 2001) or negatively (Alonso-Villar, 2001; Behrens et al., 2007) 
with (regional) income inequality depending on the spatial implications of trade integration (i.e. 
patterns of internal dispersion or agglomeration of economic activity and comparative advantage). 
Empirical evidence is also mixed with some studies pointing to a positive (Ezcurra and Rodríquez-
Pose, 2013; Rodríquez-Pose, 2012) and some to a negative (Asteriou et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2011) 
link between trade expansion and income inequality (with the relationship largely depending on the 
sample selection and empirical specification). 
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 According to Williams (2011), trade openness may also link to reporting behaviour at the country 
level. Countries more open to trade may have a tendency to release more information a. because their 
firms and individuals are exposed to norms of information disclosure of trade partners and might 
demand a similar level of transparency and b. because this can act as a positive signal to foreign 
investors. The hypothesis of whether this might also extend to the case of inequality-specific 
information will be tested in the empirical chapter that follows (for example, some countries that are 
open to trade may have a disincentive to disclose information on income inequality to their trade 
partners, if high income inequality is likely to act as a deterrent to foreign investment, e.g. because of 
income inequality being typically associated with higher incidences of crime and political instability).  
 
3. INEQUALITY AND OIL: THE EMPIRICS 
In this section we explore the association of income inequality with oil, as well as with a vector of 
other explanatory variables that have been found to be important in the literature. We rely on cross-
country panel regressions to draw empirical estimations for these underlying relationships. Table 1 
lists all variable descriptions, data sources and corresponding descriptive statistics. A matrix reporting 
pairwise correlations between all dependent and explanatory variables in our analysis is presented in 
Appendix 1 (for all countries, irrespective of reporting behaviour) and Appendix 2 (only for the 
reporting countries). Our initial empirical specification is of the following form: 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖(𝑡−5) + 𝜶2
′ 𝒁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜶3
′ 𝑹𝑖+ 𝜶4
′ 𝑻𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (1) 
where Giniit is the Gini coefficient of (net) income inequality for country i at time t, Oili(t-5) refers to 
our measure of oil richness (5-year lagged values), Z it is a vector of control variables found to 
correlate with income inequality in the literature, regional dummies and time effects are captured by 
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the vectors R i and T t respectively, and ε it corresponds to the error term
1. One needs to keep in mind 
that an omitted variable bias can either over or under-estimate the coefficient of oil if the latter is 
correlated with unobserved characteristics that have not been accounted for.  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
 We estimate equation (1) using pooled OLS regressions with country observations from an 
unbalanced panel (for the years 1975-2008). We opted for pooled OLS estimations, given that it is 
customary in the empirical literature to treat panels as extended cross-sectional datasets when 
pursuing baseline comparisons against panel Heckman selection models (which in effect also make 
use of pooled OLS procedures; e.g. see Dastidar, 2009; Dutt and Traca, 2009; Tang and Wei, 2009; 
Wooldridge, 1995; Zhou et al., 2011). For several specifications we also present the corresponding 
fixed effects estimates, although these tend to be less efficient for variables with little variation over 
time (which is the case for several of our explanatory variables, such as the measures of oil 
abundance/dependence, institutions, and GDP per capita levels, which fluctuate little from one year to 
the next; see Halaby, 2004, Hsiao, 2007 and Neumayer, 2004 for an elaborate discussion). Fixed-
effect estimations tend to overinflate the standard errors of the coefficients corresponding to variables 
with little time variation. In any case, both estimation techniques produce similar qualitative results 
with respect to the correlation between oil and income inequality. 
 We present our first empirical estimations in Table 2 (using pooled OLS). Our dependent 
variable is the Gini coefficient of net income inequality (that is, public redistribution in the form of 
taxes and fiscal transfers is taken into account when index values are calculated). The coefficient 
                                                   
1 Appendix 3 provides the number of observations per country (based on our key specification (1) of Table 3) as well 
as the corresponding country-specific mean values for the different oil wealth variables.  
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ranges between 0 and 100, with larger values corresponding to more unequal income distributions. 
Data on the Gini coefficient come from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) 
developed by Solt (2009), which provides a very wide coverage of comparable income inequality data 
across countries (for 173 countries between 1960 and 2009). The SWIID dataset standardises data 
coming from multiple sources (e.g. the United Nations University’s World Income Inequality 
Database, the OECD Income Distribution Database and the Socio-Economic Database for Latin 
America and the Caribbean by CEDLAS and the World Bank, as well as data from several national 
statistical offices). Observed values of Gini lie between 15 and 75. For all specifications, we include 
the 5-year lagged level of Income per capita (in logs), to control for any potential link between the 
level of economic development and income inequality (observed values lie between 5.7 and 11.0). 
Data on GDP per capita are provided by the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2014). Our 
data provide empirical support (significant at the 1% level) for the first hypothesis pointing to a 
negative correlation between GDP per capita levels and the Gini coefficient. We also experimented 
with the quadratic form of income per capita to check for the validity of the Kuznets curve, that 
assumes an inverse U relationship between income inequality and the level of economic development. 
There was only weak statistical support for the quadratic form, which is in line with many other 
studies who also find that multicountry data do not support the Kuznet’s hypothesis (Anand and 
Kanbur, 1993; Deininger and Squire, 1998; Andres and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2011). 
 In Column (1) of Table 2 we include the (5-year lagged) level of oil dependence (Oil rents) as an 
additional explanatory variable. We measure oil dependence as the value of annual oil rents in GDP (data 
are provided by the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2014)) – the observed values of 
Oil rents lie between 0 and 82.07%. The coefficient of oil rents is a focal point of our analysis. Column 
(1) points to a negative and statistically-significant (at the 5% level) correlation between the (net) Gini 
coefficient and oil (i.e., income inequality is lower in oil-rich economies). 
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Insert Table 2 
 
 In Column (2) we test for a non-linear relationship between oil and inequality. Some papers in the 
resource curse literature suggest that a negative relationship between oil and other development 
outcomes holds only for sufficiently high levels of oil dependence (e.g. see Mehrara, 2009, for the case 
of growth and Crivelli and Gupta, 2014, for the case of tax collection). The linear term of our oil variable 
suggests that oil is associated with lower income inequality (e.g. if oil production accounts for an extra 
10% in GDP, this corresponds to a lower Gini coefficient by approximately 1.2 units, assuming that 
countries start from very low levels of oil dependence) – the quadratic term is positive (although 
statistically insignificant), suggesting a reversal of sign; oil relates to greater inequality for very high 
levels of oil dependence (as a matter of fact, when oil rents account for more than 30% of GDP, as in the 
case of Venezuela for several years). 
 Column (3) expands the set of explanatory variables by including the Polity 2 variable from the 
Polity IV Project (variable Institutions) as a measure of institutional quality and democratic 
accountability of the political system (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). The variable is arguably the most 
commonly used source of information for capturing cross-country variation in democratic (vs. 
authoritarian) governance (Plümper and Neumayer, 2010). Higher values of the index correspond to 
more extensive democratic governance (the index takes values between -10 and 10). We find that better 
institutions correspond to lower income inequality – for instance a positive difference of 19 units in the 
index (e.g. the difference between the most authoritarian country in the sample, Belarus, and the most 
democratic one, Sweden) relates to a lower Gini coefficient by approximately 5.7 units (in the 0-100 
scale). Both the linear and quadratic terms of the oil variable appear to be statistically significant (at the 
10% and 5% level respectively), suggesting that oil is associated with lower inequality (with the 
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exception of highly oil dependent economies, where oil rents account for more than 52% of total 
income).  
 In Column (4) we enrich our empirical specification by including an additional regressor that has 
been found to correlate with income inequality in the literature, i.e. the share of agriculture in GDP 
(Agriculture). Data on the value of agricultural production are from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2014) – observed values lie between 0.06 and 73.4%. We find that the GDP share of 
agriculture is negatively correlated with income inequality as predicted by theory – when agriculture 
accounts for an extra 10% in GDP, this corresponds to a drop in the Gini coefficient by approximately 
two units. 
 In Column (5) of Table 1 we also introduce an index of ethnic fractionalisation. We make use of the 
ethnic fractionalisation index by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), which captures the probability 
of two randomly chosen individuals from the general population belonging to different ethnic groups. 
The index is of the following form: fractionalisation  =  
N
i i1
21  , where πi stands for the proportion of 
the total population belonging to the i-th ethnic group and N stands for the number of groups. The 
fractionalisation index approaches unity as the number of different ethnic groups in the economy 
increases (and takes the value of zero for a perfectly homogenous society) – observed values lie between 
0.01 and 1. The index by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) is one of the most commonly used proxies 
of ethnic fragmentation in the economic literature (e.g. see Akdede, 2010; Cole et al., 2013; Papyrakis, 
2013) and largely correlates with other indices that use slightly different levels of disaggregation 
amongst ethnic groups (e.g. the ones by Alesina et al., 2003). As it is common in cross-country 
empirical analysis, the index of fractionalisation enters the regressions as a time invariant variable (it 
is customary in the economic literature to treat ethnic diversity as a non-time-varying variable due to 
limited data availability; e.g. see Arezki and Brückner, 2012; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). 
We find ethnic heterogeneity to be positively associated with income inequality (and statistically 
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significant at the 1% level) – a relatively ethnically fractionalised country (e.g. South Africa, with a 
score of 0.90) in comparison to a relatively ethnically homogeneous nation (e.g. Finland, with a score 
of 0.01) is expected to have a Gini coefficient that is larger by approximately 8.06 units. 
 Column (6) introduces Openness as an additional explanatory factor behind cross-country 
variation in income inequality (measured by the 5-year lagged values of exports and imports in GDP; 
data are provided by the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2014)) – observed values lie 
between 6 and 444%. We find trade openness to have a negative correlation with income inequality 
(although the corresponding coefficient is statistically insignificant). For this richer specification, we 
again find that oil dependence is associated with lower income inequality, unless the country is highly 
oil dependent (with a mineral share in GDP above 25%). This fuller specification will become our 
main specification for the rest of the analysis.   
 Column (2) of Table 3 replicates the richer specification (6) of Table 2 (which appears also in 
Column (1) of Table 3 for the convenience of comparison) using a fixed effects estimation2. Results 
are qualitatively similar although some variables (e.g. institutions, agriculture, income) become less 
statistically significant (in line with our earlier concerns regarding fixed-effects estimations of 
specifications that include variables with little time variation; please note that ethnic fractionalisation 
drops out being time-invariant). The coefficients for the oil terms remain statistically significant at 
1%, with the threshold level of oil dependence above which oil resources correspond to greater 
income inequality being equal to 28% (share of oil output in GDP). 
  Since the seminal work by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), it is customary to distinguish 
between ‘resource dependence’ and ‘resource abundance’ indices, with the former measuring the 
value of resource rents as a share of economic activity (e.g. GDP, exports, etc.) and the latter in terms 
of population (i.e. a rather exogenous variable, less likely to be influenced by natural resources, 
                                                   
2 Table A1 in Appendix 4 re-estimates all columns of Table 2 using fixed effects. 
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should appear in the denominator). Several studies have found that any resource curse evidence 
disappears when one uses indices of mineral wealth in per capita terms rather than as a share of 
overall economic activity (e.g. see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Cavalcanti et al., 2011; Stijns, 
2006). In our analysis so far we used the GDP share of oil rents to measure oil dependence. Previous 
studies criticised this measure for being endogenous and associated with unobserved development 
characteristics (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; van der Ploeg 2011); in our case, this implies that 
our measure of oil richness can potentially be endogenous (as a result of being influenced by 
economic variables) and, as a result, our estimates may suffer from an endogeneity bias. For this 
reason we also check for the robustness of our main specification by experimenting with alternative 
measures of oil abundance: i.e. a. the 5-year lagged value of annual oil rents in per capita terms (in 
thousands of constant 2005 US dollars, rather than as a share of GDP; data are available from the 
World Bank, 2014 and observed values lie between 0 and 35.86 thousand US dollars) and b. the 5-
year lagged value (in tens of thousands of constant 2005 US dollars) of the per capita value of known 
oil reserves (which being a stock measure, as opposed to the previously used flow measures of annual 
oil rents, is less vulnerable to endogeneity concerns – data are available from the World Bank, 2015 
and observed values lie between 0 and 21.69). The data on the stock values of oil assets are, though, 
limited (available for 3 years; namely 1995, 2000 and 2005). Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 replicate 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 for the case of oil rents in per capita terms (pooled OLS and fixed 
effects respectively). Also in the case of our new ‘oil abundance’ measure (variable Oil rents pc), oil 
is associated with lower income inequality, unless the country is extremely oil abundant (with a value 
of oil abundance approximately five to seven standard deviations above the mean respectively; see 
Columns (3) and (4)). Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 do the same for our second ‘oil abundance’ 
proxy (the value of known oil reserves in per capita terms; variable: Oil reserves pc). Results are very 
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similar. Oil reserves are associated with lower income inequality with the exception of those very oil 
abundant economies (e.g. Venezuela).  
  
Insert Table 3 
 
Table 4 replicates Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 by substituting the original institutional 
variable with three institutional dummies: i.e., Institutions (very bad), Institutions (bad), Institutions 
(average), that take a value of 1 when our original institutional variable (Institutions) takes values 
between -10≤Institutions≤-5, -5<Institutions≤0 and 0<Institutions≤5 respectively (in other words, 
Institutions>5, i.e. the category with the highest scores for institutions, becomes the omitted category 
as it represents the dominant, most populous, group in our sample; for a discussion see Allen, 1997, 
p.138). These four ranges correspond to the four categories proposed by the Polity IV project, where 
the lowest scores in the range [-10, -5] characterise autocracies (i.e. a system of governance where 
the power is concentrated primarily in the hands of very few people, as in the case of absolute 
monarchy or a dictatorship), scores in the range (-5, 0] characterise closed anocracies (i.e. regimes 
that incorporate both autocratic and democratic elements, although any political competition is 
limited to dominant elite groups), scores in the range (0, 5] characterise open anocracies (i.e. regimes 
similar to closed anocracies, with the key difference being that political competition extends to a 
broader range of groups) and scores above 5 characterise democracies (i.e. systems of governance 
where the supreme power is vested in the people, through free and fair elections). Results (regarding 
the association between oil and inequality) are very similar, suggesting that oil dependence relates to 
lower income inequality (with the exception of the very oil-rich economies). The results (Column (1) 
of Table 4) suggest that, in comparison to the reference group of democratic countries, it is the 
countries in the middle range of democratic institutions (i.e. bad and average institutions) that are 
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characterised by higher income inequality – autocracies (i.e. the countries with very bad institutions) 
do not appear to suffer from higher inequality (this is in line with Chong, 2004; Bourguignon and 
Verdier, 2000, who claim that at intermediate stages of democratisation it is mainly the middle 
classes that benefit rather than the poor, corresponding hence to an increase in income inequality).3 
Column (2) replicates the specification using fixed effects – the institutional dummies are not 
statistically significant (with the exception of the average institutions dummy, which is only 
significant at the 10% level), possibly as a result of their very limited time variation within the sample 
(results are also very similar when replicating the regressions for our alternative measures of oil 
wealth).  
 
Insert Table 4 
 
 As an additional robustness check we replicate our richest empirical specification (for different 
proxies of oil wealth) by substituting income (GDP per capita) with latitude (data on latitude by Hall 
and Jones, 1999, observed values between 1 and 64 degrees); the pooled OLS results are presented in 
the first three columns of Table 5. Proximity to the tropics (captured by latitude) has been extensively 
used in empirical cross-country analysis as a proxy that can address the possible endogeneity of the 
levels of economic development (with proximity to the tropics determining income levels via the 
adverse health environment, e.g. see Angeles and Neanidis, 2015 and Pellegrini, 2011). Latitude is 
strongly and negatively correlated with income inequality; i.e. poorer nations closer to the tropics 
                                                   
3 We also experimented with the quadratic form of institutions for all regressions, but found very weak support of a 
quadratic, inverse-U relationship; the linear specification, instead, always points to a statistically-significant negative 
relationship, suggesting that while inequality peaks at intermediate stages of democratization, democracies generally 
have the lowest inequality scores on the whole. In any case, irrespective of the use of quadratic or linear terms, the 
coefficients of the oil terms remains very similar in size and statistical significance. 
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suffer from greater income inequality. There is little change in the estimated coefficients for all oil 
wealth proxies – oil richness is associated with lower income inequality with the exception of the 
very oil abundant/dependent nations. Another exogenous geographical variable that correlates 
strongly with the level of economic development is landlockedness (e.g. see Henderson et al., 2001; 
Sachs and Warner, 1997) – Columns (4)-(6) of Table 5 replicate the same specifications with 
landlockedness in place of income per capita (data on landlockedness by CIA, 2014). Landlocked 
nations tend to be characterised by lower levels of income inequality, although the effect is not 
statistically significant. Once again, oil abundance/dependence correlates negatively with income 
inequality with the exception of the very oil-rich economies.  
 
Insert Table 5 
  
4. OIL, UNDER-REPORTING AND HECKMAN CORRECTION 
The statistical analysis presented in Section 3 can potentially provide erroneous conclusions to the 
extent that the statistical sample is non-random. In other words, it might be the case that the fact that 
some countries might provide no data on inequality for particular years (and hence are not included in 
the sample) is not unsystematic and can instead relate to some underlying factors (that we touched 
upon in Section 2). The two-step method of the Heckman correction model provides the means to 
correct for such non-randomly selected samples. The Heckman correction model allows us to use the 
limited non-random sample (i.e. the censored data, using the Heckman jargon) to draw inferences also 
for those countries for which we have missing values (the non-reporting ones) – what we need in 
order to do this, is to find out whether there is a statistical pattern explaining why a country might 
report or not data on inequality at a given time. 
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 In an earlier study, Ross (2007) claimed that mineral rich countries tend to under-report data on 
income inequality (and are hence likely to be under-represented in the sample). Such under-reporting 
and corresponding sample bias can influence the estimated empirical relationship between measures 
of oil wealth and income inequality to the extent that under-reporting is not random and correlates 
with oil abundance/dependence and other underlying factors. In this section we estimate a series of 
Heckman selection models that allow us to correct for the bias that might arise from such under-
reporting when estimating the relationship between inequality and oil. The first stage of the Heckman 
selection model estimates a selection equation, where the propensity to report (or not) depends on a 
number of factors. In this step (which is equivalent to a Probit regression) we hypothesise that 
reporting on income inequality might be associated with the extent of oil abundance/dependence, 
amongst other explanatory variables. In effect, the dependent variable in the first stage of the 
Heckman model is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country is reporting data on income 
inequality for that particular year, and 0 otherwise and we wish to see whether this dummy variable 
significantly correlates with a vector of regressors. Naturally, some countries might under-report data 
on income inequality as a result of a broader tendency to under-report data of any kind, for example 
as a consequence of weak government administration (i.e. the tendency to under-report data on 
income inequality may reflect inadequate government capacity, or simply bad practice, rather than 
any intentional effort to conceal information that could be considered to be sensitive). For this reason 
we construct an index (Data reporting index) that proxies the overall tendency (capacity) of countries 
to report data of any kind4 – we measure this as the number of data entries reported for any variables 
appearing in the World Development Indicators database for country i and year t (World Bank, 2014), 
                                                   
4 In addition this variable acts as an exclusion restriction. In the Heckman selection model an exclusion restriction is 
a variable that appears in the selection equation, but not in the outcome equation. The inclusion of such a variable is 
the most common means of solving the over-identification problem, see Fu and Mare (2004). 
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expressed as a share of the number of (annual) data entries for the ‘average reporting country’ during 
the period of analysis. Observed values lie between 0.31 and 2.72. We expect that the Data reporting 
index is likely to correlate positively with the probability of disclosing data on income inequality. 
 More specifically, the Heckman model considers that observations are ordered into two regimes. 
In the present context these regimes are defined by whether or not the country reports data on 
inequality. The first stage defines a dichotomous variable indicating the regime into which the 
observation falls: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜏1𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏2𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖(𝑡−5) + 𝝉3
′ 𝒁𝑖𝑡+ 𝝉4
′ 𝑹𝑖+ 𝝉5
′ 𝑻𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (2) 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 1  if  𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0  (in which case income inequality is observed as in eq (1) and 
       𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 0  if  𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 0 (in which case data on income inequality are missing), (3) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗  is a latent variable indicating the utility of reporting data on income inequality, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is an 
indicator for the reporting behaviour (the dummy we described earlier), 𝒁𝑖𝑡 is the vector of control 
variables already defined above, regional dummies and time effects are captured in the vectors R i and 
T t respectively (for the rest of the analysis we will omit these two vectors to simplify notation and 
assume they are part of vector Z), and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Keeping the exact same control variables 
of the vector Z in both the main regression, as well as the selection equation, is common practice (e.g. 
see Baudassé and Bazillier, 2014; Fleck and Kilby, 2010) - and as a matter of fact, it is advisable, 
given that the exclusion of some of the original control variables can lead to inconsistent estimates; 
for a discussion see Wooldridge (2012, p.619). We use the two-step method estimation which is 
based on the following conditional expectation5: 
                                                   
5 The two-step estimation relies on a univariate normality assumption for 𝜖𝑖𝑡 and 𝜐𝑖𝑡  and is expected to be relatively 
more robust that the Maximum Likelihood estimation, which relies on a bivariate normality assumption. 
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𝐸(𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡|𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0, 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖(𝑡−5), 𝒁𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽1𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖(𝑡−5) + 𝜷2𝒁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑡(𝜙(∙) Φ(∙)⁄ ) + 𝜐𝑖𝑡, (4) 
where 𝜆𝑖𝑡(𝜙(∙) Φ(∙)⁄ ) is the inverse Mill’s ratio, defined by the ratio of the density function of the 
standard normal distribution, 𝜙, to its cumulative density function, Φ. The third term in (4) can be 
estimated by 𝜆𝑖𝑡(?̂?1𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎_𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?2𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖(𝑡−5) + ?̂?3
′ 𝒁𝑖𝑡), where ?̂?1, ?̂?2 and ?̂?3
′  are 
obtained by applying a Probit regression to (2). The regression of 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 on 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖(𝑡−5) and 𝒁𝑖𝑡 and the 
generated regressor, 𝜆𝑖𝑡(?̂?1𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?2𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖(𝑡−5) + ?̂?3
′ 𝒁𝑖𝑡) yields a semi-parametric 
estimate of (𝛽1, 𝜷2, 𝛽𝜆). 
 Let’s first start with the oil dependence variable we initially used in our analysis in Section 3 (i.e. 
the share of oil rents in GDP). The results of the first stage of the Heckman selection model are 
presented at the bottom panel of Table 6 (Column (1)), where the first regressor is the Data reporting 
index and the rest of the regressors appear in the same order as the ones present in the empirical 
specifications of Table 3 (i.e. the panel regressions that do not correct for any systematic selection 
bias). Some interesting findings are revealed. First, in line with Ross (2007), we find that oil rich 
nations tend to under-report on income inequality (a relationship that is statistically significant at the 
1% level in all the specifications). This holds even when we control for the Data reporting index, 
which captures the overall tendency (capacity) of countries to report data of any kind (the effect is 
positive and statistically significant). Democratic accountability (Institutions), agriculture, income per 
capita and fractionalisation are also positively and significantly correlated with reporting behaviour 
(while trade openness has the opposite sign). It is important to note that the parameter λ (bottom panel 
of Table 6) appears to be significant in all regressions, suggesting that the null hypothesis of a 
selection problem is not rejected. In more technical terms, the null hypothesis that the two parts of the 
model are independent is rejected. 
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Insert Table 6 
 
 The results of the second stage of the Heckman Selection Model (top panel of Table 6) make 
inferences based on both the countries reporting data on inequality, as well as the non-reporting ones 
for which data were inferred based on the first stage. However, the coefficients of the Heckman’s 
second stage cannot be directly interpreted as the corresponding marginal effects, which need to be 
calculated separately. Some earlier papers in the literature show unawareness of this issue, though the 
formula for the calculation of the marginal effect in the Heckman Selection Model has been gaining 
popularity. The formula is explained in detail in Green (2000), as well as in Hoffmann and Kassouf 
(2005). Moreover, a general version of it is proposed in Frondel and Vance (2009), which allows for 
the calculation of the marginal effect even in the presence of interaction terms. The marginal effects 
essentially capture both the direct link of the independent variable to income inequality (second stage 
of Heckman) as well as the indirect effect on the probability that an observation is part of the sample 
(first stage of Heckman). Moreover, there are two types of marginal effects in the Heckman Selection 
Model, the conditional and the unconditional ones. The conditional marginal effect is the one for the 
observed (uncensored) sample and so the most appropriate to be compared against the coefficients 
from the pooled OLS regressions (Section 3). The conditional marginal effects corresponding to 
Column (1) of Table 6 (for mean values of variables) have been calculated by using formula A1 in 
Appendix 5 (see Frondel and Vance, 2009, for a detailed description) and are presented next to the 
Heckman coefficients. Clearly, the marginal effects do not need to have the same magnitude or even 
the same sign as the second stage coefficients; the latter case occurs, for example, for the variable 
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Openness.6 Oil rents are negatively associated with net income inequality (and are statistically 
significant at the 1% level) – this is also in line with our earlier findings in Section 3, suggesting that 
the empirical relationship between oil and lower inequality (below a certain level of oil dependence) 
is robust to any selection bias arising from the tendency of oil-rich countries to under-report data on 
income inequality (as a matter of fact, the marginal effect suggested by the Heckman model is a bit 
larger compared to the estimated effect of oil rents (at their mean) of the corresponding pooled OLS 
regression; i.e. of Column (1) of Table 3). Fractionalisation also appears to be positively and 
significantly linked to net income inequality (while the opposite holds for agriculture).  
 Figure 1 presents the marginal effects (blue dotted line) of oil rents (as a share of GDP) on income 
inequality for varying levels of oil dependence that correspond to Column (1) of Table 6 (one can see 
that the marginal effect of oil dependence on inequality is negative for countries with a share of oil rents 
in GDP below 23.5%). The confidence intervals (red dotted lines) around the marginal effects line 
determine the statistical significance of the marginal effect of oil (at each given level of oil dependence); 
the marginal effect is statistically significant at the 5% level when both the upper and lower bounds of 
the confidence intervals are below the zero line (i.e. for a share of oil rents in GDP below 19%). One can 
see, that, for countries where Oil rents are close to their sample-mean value of 3.7, a marginal increase in 
the share of oil rents in GDP by 1% is associated with lower income inequality (i.e. the Gini coefficient) 
by 0.539 units. The link between oil and lower income inequality decreases in magnitude as the share of 
oil rents in GDP increases (e.g. one can see from Figure 1 that the corresponding marginal effect is close 
to -0.3, when the share of oil rents in GDP is close to 12%). 
 
Insert Figure 1 
                                                   
6 The reason for this is clear in formula A1 of Appendix 5. Note that one important determinant of the marginal 
effect sign is the sign of 𝛿(𝑢1). 
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 Column (2) of Table 6 replicates the Heckman selection model for our first alternative ‘oil 
abundance’ measure, i.e. the value of oil rents in per capita terms. The conditional marginal effects 
(for mean values of variables) are also presented next to the Heckman coefficients. Results are in line 
with the earlier findings of Section 3 – although oil abundant countries tend to under-report data on 
inequality, the selection bias does not alter our earlier findings pointing to a negative relationship 
between oil and lower inequality (for moderate levels of oil rents in per capita terms). Figure 2 
presents the marginal effects of oil abundance (oil rents pc) on income inequality for varying levels of 
oil abundance corresponding to Column (2) of Table 6 (the marginal effect of per capita oil rents on 
inequality is negative for countries with a moderate level of oil abundance; i.e. below 3.2 thousand 
US dollars per head in constant 2005 prices). One can see, that, for countries where Oil rents pc (per 
capita oil rents) are close to their sample-mean value of 0.25 (i.e. 250 US$), an increase in per capita oil 
rents by 100 dollars is associated with lower income inequality (i.e. the Gini coefficient) by 
approximately 0.55 units. Column (3) of Table 6 replicates the Heckman specification using our second 
‘oil abundance’ proxy (the value of known oil reserves in per capita terms; variable: Oil reserves pc) 
– results are also in line with our earlier findings. 
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
 In Table 7 we replicate the Heckman selection specifications of Table 6 for our three oil 
measures (oil rents in GDP, oil rents per capita, oil reserves per capita), using latitude in place of the 
income variable. The coefficients (and corresponding marginal effects) of the oil measures change 
very little. Figures 3 and 4 present the marginal effects for oil rents in GDP and per capita oil rents 
respectively, for varying levels of corresponding resource dependence (abundance). The results are in 
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line with our earlier findings (i.e. oil resources are associated with lower income inequality, for 
moderate values of oil affluence).7 
 
Insert Table 7 
Insert Figure 3 
Insert Figure 4 
3. CONCLUSION 
 There has been an increasing interest in recent years in the relationship between oil and broader 
socio-economic development. Oil rents can, in principle, link to lower income inequality by 
magnifying the ability of governments to redistribute public revenues and improve the relative 
position of the economically disadvantaged. Surprisingly, though, the relationship between oil wealth 
and income inequality has been largely under-researched. In this paper we empirically explore in depth 
the relationship between oil abundance/dependence and income inequality by making use of the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) and we pay particular attention to the 
tendency of oil rich nations to under-report relevant data. We make use of Heckman selection models 
to validate the tendency of oil rich countries to under-report and correct for the bias that might arise 
as a result of this – we find that oil resources are associated with greater income inequality only for 
the very oil-dependent economies (and have the opposite effect for moderate levels of oil 
dependence/abundance).   
 These findings have significant policy implications. With limited information about the link 
between oil and income inequality (and given the general presumption from the resource curse 
                                                   
7 We also replicated the results using the three institutional dummy variables of Table 4, as well as for 
landlockedness in place of latitude. Results are in line with our earlier findings and are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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literature pointing to a negative relationship between oil resources and most development outcomes), 
policy-makers are likely to expect that oil rents are associated with a less equitable distribution of 
income. The tendency of oil rich economies to under-report data on income inequality might also hint 
on an intentional effort to conceal such sensitive information. Here, we have shown that oil resources 
in most cases are associated with a more equitable income distribution (and with greater income 
inequality only for the more extreme cases of oil abundance/dependence). For this reason, 
governments in modestly oil rich nations, as well as the international community (donors, 
international organizations), do not need to design a different set of distributive policies but rather pay 
more attention on how to utilize the oil rents against resource curse ‘ailments’ that are already well-
established in the literature (such as the lack of economic diversification or excessive investment in 
‘white elephant’-type public investment projects).    
 The question of what makes some countries more successful than others in managing their oil 
revenues is certainly one of the most fascinating economists can ask. Our analysis is simply a first 
step in exploring the intriguing relationship between oil and income inequality. Future research could 
attempt to disentangle in more detail the mechanisms (or the ‘transmission channels’ as commonly 
referred to in the literature) through which oil resources can influence the income distribution – for 
example by looking at income inequality levels across regions, gender groups or economic sectors. 
Another direction for future research would be to complement large-sample econometric studies with 
more case histories of economic policy in oil-rich countries (e.g. by looking at how decision-making 
and redistributive policies are shaped in the context of oil dependent economies). 
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TABLE 1. List of Variables Used in Regression Analysis and Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Name  Variable Description and Data Source Mean Standard Deviation Minimum/Maximum 
Gini 
 
Gini coefficient of income inequality (net of taxes 
and transfers). Index ranging between 0 and 100, 
with larger values corresponding to more unequal 
income distributions. Source: Solt (2009). 
37 
[37] 
11 
[11] 
15/75 
[15]/[75] 
Income  5-year lagged real GDP per capita (constant 2005 
US dollars). Source: World Bank (2014). 
9,090  
[14,201]  
9,579  
[9,567]  
309/59,239 
[918]/[42,490] 
Log Income Natural logarithm of Income variable. Source: 
World Bank (2014). 
9.1 
[9.6] 
9.2 
[9.2] 
5.7/11.0 
[6.8]/[10.7] 
Latitude The absolute value of the latitude of a country. 
Source: Hall and Jones (1999). 
23 
[31] 
16 
[19] 
1/64 
[1]/[64] 
Landlocked  Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if country 
landlocked, 0 otherwise. Data from the CIA (2014) 
World Factbook. 
0.18 
[0.09] 
0.39 
[0.28] 
0/1 
[0]/[1] 
Oil rents  5-year lagged value of the share of annual oil rents 
in GDP (Source: World Bank (2014). 
3.7 
[2.3] 
8.35 
[5.14] 
0/82.07 
[0]/[43.75] 
Oil rents pc  5-year lagged value (in thousands of constant 2005 
US dollars) of annual oil rents in per capita terms 
(Source: World Bank (2014). 
0.25 
[0.13] 
1.4 
[0.45] 
0/35.86 
[0]/[6.34] 
Oil reserves pc  5-year lagged value (in tens of thousands of 
constant 2005 US dollars) of the per capita value of 
known oil reserves. The value of oil reserves is 
calculated as the present value of expected rents 
from oil extraction, discounted at 4 percent. For 
data and discussion of methodology behind 
calculation, see World Bank (2015). 
0.45 
[0.19] 
1.89 
[0.65] 
0/21.69 
[0]/[5.72] 
Institutions  
 
Polity 2 index (in the range between -10 to 10) from 
the Polity IV Project measuring the democratic 
accountability of the political system. Higher values 
corresponding to greater democratic governance. 
Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2009). 
2.7 
[6.9] 
7 
[5.1] 
-10/10 
[-9]/[10] 
Agriculture  
 
Share of agricultural production in GDP. Source: 
World Bank (2014). 
14.8 
[17.6] 
14 
[15.2] 
0.0610/73.4 
[0.86]/[72.6] 
Fractionalisation  
 
Ethnic fractionalisation index (0-1 continuous 
scale). Source: Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005). 
0.47 
[0.38] 
0.28 
[0.27] 
0.01/1 
[0.01]/[0.9] 
Openness  The share of the value of exports and imports in 
GDP (5-year lagged values). Source: World Bank 
(2014). 
71 
[72] 
47 
[55] 
6/444 
[12]/[444] 
Reporting 
behaviour  
0-1 index measuring reporting behaviour of income 
inequality data (Gini, redistribution). A 0 value 
corresponds to non-reporting. Values calculated by 
authors based on data by Solt (2009).    
0.43 
[1] 
0.5 
[0] 
0/1 
[0]/[1] 
Data reporting 
index  
A proxy of the overall tendency (capacity) of 
countries to report data of any kind. The index is 
measured as the number of data entries reported for 
any variables appearing in the World Development 
Indicators database for country i and year t (World 
Bank, 2014) as a share of the number of (annual) 
data entries for the ‘average reporting country’ 
during the period of analysis. 
1.27 
[1.32] 
0.19 
[0.14] 
0.31/2.72 
[0.8]/[1.65] 
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Note: This table is based on the observations included in specification (6) of Table 2. Descriptive 
statistics for the joint sample of both Gini reporting and non-reporting countries are outside the squared 
brackets. Descriptive statistics for the sample of reporting countries are inside squared brackets.  
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TABLE 2. Effects of Oil Dependence on Net Income Inequality (Pooled OLS) 
Dependent variable:  
Gini 
(1) 
Gini 
(2) 
Gini 
(3) 
Gini 
(4) 
Gini 
(5) 
Gini 
(6) 
Log Income  
-4.454*** 
(0.281) 
-4.477*** 
(0.278) 
-3.372*** 
(0.392) 
-4.104*** 
(0.377) 
-4.004*** 
(0.478) 
-3.999*** 
(0.473) 
Oil rents 
 
-0.072** 
(0.029) 
 
-0.123** 
(0.049) 
 
-0.209*** 
(0.048) 
 
-0.255*** 
(0.043) 
 
-0.495*** 
(0.068) 
 
-0.496*** 
(0.068) 
 
Oil rents (sq) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.001) 
 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 
Institutions 
 
  
-0.301*** 
(0.052) 
 
-0.168*** 
(0.043) 
 
-0.214*** 
(0.045) 
-0.215** 
(0.046) 
Agriculture    
-0.201*** 
(0.014) 
 
-0.164*** 
(0.015) 
-0.164*** 
(0.016) 
Fractionalisation 
 
 
 
 
  
9.053*** 
(0.743) 
 
9.013*** 
(0.811) 
 
Openness 
 
 
 
 
   
-0.068 
(0.299) 
R 2 adjusted 0.563 0.565 0.608 0.663 0.735 0.734 
N 1935 1935 1592 1572 1348 1348 
Countries 81 81 75 75 55 55 
Note: Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. Year and regional dummies (Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Latin America) 
included in all specifications. A detailed description of all variables is provided in Table 1. 
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TABLE 3. Effects of Oil Dependence/Abundance on Income Inequality (pooled OLS/ Fixed Effects) 
Dependent variable:  
Gini 
(OLS) 
(1) 
Gini 
(FE) 
(2) 
Gini 
(OLS) 
(3) 
Gini 
(FE) 
(4) 
Gini 
(OLS) 
(5) 
Gini 
(FE) 
(6) 
Log Income  -3.999*** 
(0.473) 
5.092* 
(2.991) 
-3.589*** 
(0.488) 
5.730 
(3.638) 
-4.927*** 
(0.708) 
10.788*** 
(3.529) 
Oil rents 
 
-0.496*** 
(0.068) 
 
-0.896*** 
(0.316) 
 
    
Oil rents (sq) 
 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
 
    
Oil rents pc 
 
  
-5.257*** 
(0.552) 
 
-2.065** 
(0.937) 
 
  
Oil rents pc (sq) 
 
  
0.851*** 
(0.134) 
 
0.415** 
(0.159) 
 
  
Oil reserves pc  
 
    
-5.022*** 
(0.713) 
2.599 
(3.576) 
Oil reserves pc (sq) 
 
    
0.749*** 
(0.162) 
-0.257 
(0.401) 
Institutions 
 
-0.215** 
(0.046) 
0.057 
(0.147) 
-0.189*** 
(0.045) 
0.081 
(0.164) 
-0.231*** 
(0.088) 
-0.026 
(0.128) 
Agriculture -0.164*** 
(0.016) 
-0.301** 
(0.139) 
-0.183*** 
(0.016) 
-0.270* 
(0.157) 
-0.229*** 
(0.025) 
-0.212* 
(0.126) 
Fractionalisation 
 
9.013*** 
(0.811) 
 
 
7.229*** 
(0.780) 
 
 
7.352*** 
(1.350) 
 
Openness 
 
-0.068 
(0.299) 
0.923 
(1.374) 
-0.054 
(0.301) 
1.149 
(1.528) 
-0.781* 
(0.419) 
-0.809 
(1.590) 
R 2 adjusted 0.734 0.260 0.731 0.203 0.736 0.187 
N 1348 1348 1348 1348 582 582 
Countries 55 55 55 55 54 54 
Note: Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. Year dummies included in all specifications; regional dummies (Sub-Saharan Africa, East 
Asia, South Asia, Latin America) included in pooled OLS specifications. A detailed description of all variables 
is provided in Table 1. 
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TABLE 4. Effects of Oil Dependence on Net Income Inequality (Institutional Dummy Variables) 
Dependent variable:  
Gini 
(OLS) 
(1) 
Gini 
(FE) 
(2) 
Log Income  -4.934*** 
[0.504] 
4.681 
[2.964] 
Oil rents  
 
-0.473*** 
[0.071] 
-0.890*** 
[0.321] 
Oil rents (sq) 
 
0.008*** 
[0.003] 
0.016*** 
[0.006] 
Institutions (very bad) 
 
0.270 
[0.900] 
-1.026 
[2.405] 
Institutions (bad) 
 
5.475*** 
[0.858] 
-1.129 
[2.011] 
Institutions (average) 
 
3.607*** 
[0.894] 
-2.141* 
[1.069] 
Agriculture -0.157*** 
[0.015] 
-0.298** 
[0.136] 
Fractionalisation 
 
8.304*** 
[0.810] 
 
Openness 
 
-0.631** 
[0.314] 
0.944 
[1.335] 
R 2 adjusted 0.742 0.271 
N 1348 1348 
Countries 55 55 
Note: Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. Year dummies included in all specifications; regional dummies (Sub-Saharan Africa, East 
Asia, South Asia, Latin America) included in the pooled OLS specification (1). A detailed description of all 
variables is provided in Table 1. 
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TABLE 5. Effects of Oil on Net Income Inequality (Latitude/Landlocked; Pooled OLS) 
Dependent variable:  
Gini 
(1) 
(Latitude) 
Gini 
(2) 
(Latitude) 
Gini 
(3) 
(Latitude) 
Gini 
(4) 
(Landlocked) 
Gini 
(5) 
(Landlocked) 
Gini 
(6) 
(Landlocked) 
Latitude / Landlocked -0.179*** 
(0.015) 
-0.150*** 
(0.015) 
-0.204*** 
(0.027) 
-0.480 
(0.600) 
-0.155 
(0.587) 
-0.986 
(1.096) 
Oil rents 
 
-0.561*** 
(0.061) 
 
  
-0.544*** 
(0.069) 
  
Oil rents (sq) 
 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 
  
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
  
Oil rents pc 
 
 
-5.371*** 
(0.619) 
 
  
-6.841*** 
(0.647) 
 
Oil rents pc (sq) 
 
 
0.860*** 
(0.169) 
 
  
1.108*** 
(0.181) 
 
Oil reserves pc  
 
  
-7.636*** 
(0.924) 
  
-7.196*** 
(0.850) 
Oil reserves pc (sq) 
 
  
1.412*** 
(0.250) 
  
1.138*** 
(0.207) 
Institutions 
 
-0.379*** 
(0.046) 
-0.343*** 
(0.046) 
-0.468*** 
(0.077) 
-0.543*** 
(0.043) 
-0.469*** 
(0.044) 
-0.682*** 
(0.074) 
Agriculture -0.130*** 
(0.017) 
-0.150*** 
(0.017) 
-0.160*** 
(0.029) 
-0.147*** 
(0.017) 
-0.171*** 
(0.017) 
-0.196*** 
(0.028) 
Fractionalisation 
 
7.071*** 
(0.710) 
 
5.392*** 
(0.711) 
 
6.080*** 
(1.253) 
10.248*** 
(0.941) 
8.320*** 
(0.901) 
9.120*** 
(1.671) 
Openness 
 
-1.210*** 
(0.294) 
-1.013*** 
(0.294) 
-2.114*** 
(0.466) 
-0.272 
(0.319) 
-0.237 
(0.313) 
-0.974** 
(0.461) 
R 2 adjusted 0.739 0.731 0.732 0.705 0.708 0.694 
N 1348 1348 582 1,348 1,348 582 
Countries 55 55 54 55 55 54 
Note: Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% 
level of significance. Year and regional dummies (Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Latin America) 
included in all specifications. A detailed description of all variables is provided in Table 1. 
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TABLE 6. Oil, Under-reporting on Net Inequality and Heckman Correction  
Dependent variable: 
Gini (net) (2nd stage) 
(1) 
Oil rents 
(2) 
Oil rents pc 
(3) 
Oil reserves pc 
Heckman 
Marginal 
Effects 
Heckman 
Marginal 
Effects 
Heckman Marginal 
Effects 
Log Income  -4.315*** 
(0.516) 
  -3.361*** 
(0.503) 
-3.966*** 
(0.542) 
-2.795*** 
(0.533) 
-6.727*** 
(0.744) 
-1.453 
(1.032) 
Oil (several measures) -0.550*** 
(0.078) 
-0.539*** 
(0.071) 
-4.901*** 
(0.780) 
-5.259*** 
(0.761) 
-4.253*** 
(1.101) 
-5.335*** 
(1.104) 
Oil (sq) (several 
measures) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.863*** 
(0.183) 
 
0.704*** 
(0.254) 
 
Institutions -0.248*** 
(0.050) 
-0.199*** 
(0.048) 
-0.241*** 
(0.051) 
-0.181*** 
(0.048) 
-0.384*** 
(0.080) 
-.2665*** 
(0091) 
Agriculture -0.162*** 
(0.016) 
-0.125*** 
(0.024) 
-0.175*** 
(0.016) 
-0.136*** 
(0.023) 
-0.269*** 
(0.026) 
-0.082 
(0. 050) 
Fractionalisation 8.784*** 
(0.845) 
9.581*** 
(0.912) 
6.804*** 
(0.804) 
7.523*** 
(0.839) 
4.778*** 
(1.356) 
9.230*** 
(1.827) 
Openness 0.073 
(0.289) 
-0.187 
(0.321) 
0.013 
(0.289) 
-0.246 
(0.318) 
-0.534 
(0.455) 
-2.377*** 
(0. 769) 
Dependent variable: 
Reporting behaviour  
(1ststage) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data reporting index 1.961*** 
(0.251) 
 
 1.956*** 
(0.251) 
 
 2.669*** 
(0.485) 
 
Income  
 
 
0.920*** 
(0.058) 
 
 0.992*** 
(0.060) 
 
 1.197*** 
(0.111) 
 
Oil (several measures) -0.046*** 
(0.012) 
 
 -0.500*** 
(0.077) 
 
 -0.309*** 
(0.103) 
 
Oil (sq) (several 
measures) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
 0.013*** 
(0.003) 
 0.005 
(0.011) 
 
Institutions 
 
0.047*** 
(0.006) 
 0.052*** 
(0.006) 
 0.027** 
(0.011) 
 
Agriculture 
 
0.035*** 
(0.004) 
 
 0.034*** 
(0.003) 
 
 0.042*** 
(0.006) 
 
Fractionalisation 
 
0.768*** 
(0.174) 
 
 0.760*** 
(0.164) 
 
 1.010*** 
(0.267) 
 
Openness 
 
-0.251*** 
(0.066) 
 
 -0.219** 
(0.066) 
 
 -0.418*** 
(0.119) 
 
𝛽𝜆 
 
-1.207*** 
(0.962) 
 
 
 
 
 
 -1.375*** 
(0.958) 
 
 
 
 
 
 -4.934*** 
(1.202) 
 
Uncensored Observ. 1348  1348  582  
Censored Observ. 1655  1655  556  
Censored Countries 55  55  54  
Note: Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of 
significance. Year and regional dummies (Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Latin America) included in all 
specifications. A detailed description of all variables is provided in Table 1. Calculations of the marginal effects and standard 
errors (inside parentheses) done through the ‘delta method’ by using the Stata command nlcom (based on the sample mean 
values of variables for each specification).  
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TABLE 7. Oil, Under-reporting on Net Inequality and Heckman Correction (Latitude)  
Dependent variable: 
Gini (net) (2nd stage) 
(1) 
Oil rents 
(2) 
Oil rents pc 
(3) 
Oil reserves pc 
Heckman 
Marginal 
Effects 
Heckman 
Marginal 
Effects 
Heckman 
Marginal 
Effects 
Latitude -0.161*** 
(0.017) 
-0.222*** 
(0.020) 
-0.132*** 
(0.001) 
-0. 202*** 
(0.021) 
-0.214*** 
(0.023) 
-0.183*** 
(0. 028) 
Oil (several measures) -0.613*** 
(0.724) 
-0506*** 
(0.069) 
-5.008*** 
(0.001) 
-4.678*** 
(0.760) 
-7.271*** 
(1.114) 
-6.358*** 
(1.101) 
Oil (sq) (several 
measures) 
0.012*** 
(0.174) 
 
0.782*** 
(0.001) 
 
1.329*** 
(0.270) 
 
Institutions -0.248*** 
(0.057) 
-0437*** 
(0048) 
-0.206*** 
(0.001) 
-.425*** 
(0.049) 
-0.569*** 
(0.090) 
-0.437*** 
(0. 073) 
Agriculture -0.086*** 
(0.014) 
-0.145*** 
(0. 020) 
-0.103*** 
(0.001) 
-0.164*** 
(0.020) 
-0.162*** 
(0.024) 
-0.120*** 
(0.031) 
Fractionalisation 7.231*** 
(0.786) 
5.825*** 
(0.974) 
5.459*** 
(0.001) 
3.978*** 
(0.957) 
4.715*** 
(1.301) 
5.546*** 
(1.355) 
Openness -1.373*** 
(0.271) 
-1.484*** 
(0.333) 
-1.235*** 
(0.001) 
-1.457*** 
(0.349) 
-2.129*** 
(0.448) 
-2.181*** 
(0. 468) 
Dependent variable: 
Reporting behaviour  
(1ststage) 
      
Data reporting index 2.101*** 
(0.211) 
 
 
2.257*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
3.560*** 
(0.432) 
 
Latitude  
 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
0.027*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
 
Oil (several measures) -0.023*** 
(0.081) 
 
 
-0.047 
(0.647) 
 
 
0.284 
(0.250) 
 
Oil (sq) (several 
measures) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
 
-0.002 
(0.912) 
 
-0.060 
(0.059) 
 
Institutions 
 
0.079*** 
(0.005) 
 
0.085*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.085*** 
(0.010) 
 
Agriculture 
 
0.025*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
0.024*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.027*** 
(0.005) 
 
Fractionalisation 
 
0.589*** 
(0.154) 
 
 
0.573*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.537** 
(0.253) 
 
Openness 
 
0.046 
(0.056) 
 
 
0.086 
(0.152) 
 
 
-0.034 
(0.099) 
 
𝛽𝜆 
 
2.690*** 
(0.97) 
 
 
2.879*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
-1.637 
(0.152) 
 
Uncensored Observ. 1348  1348  582  
Censored Observ. 1655  1655  556  
Censored Countries 55  55  54  
Note: Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of 
significance. Year and regional dummies (Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Latin America) included in all 
specifications. A detailed description of all variables is provided in Table 1. Calculations of the marginal effects and standard 
errors (inside parentheses) done through the ‘delta method’ by using the Stata command nlcom (based on the sample mean 
values of variables for each specification).  
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FIGURE 1. Marginal Effects of Oil on Gini (Net) for Different Values of Oil Dependence (Specification 
1, Table 6) 
 
Note: Marginal effects based on specification 1 of Table 6. All other regressors at their mean values. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Marginal Effects of Oil on Gini (Net) for Different Values of Oil Abundance (Specification 
2, Table 6) 
 
Note: Marginal effects based on specification 2 of Table 6. All other regressors at their mean values.  
 
 
 
  
43 
 
FIGURE 3. Marginal Effects of Oil on Gini (Net) for Different Values of Oil Dependence (Latitude, 
Specification 1, Table 7) 
 
Note: Marginal effects based on specification 1 of Table 7. All other regressors at their mean values.  
 
 
FIGURE 4. Marginal Effects of Oil on Gini (Net) for Different Values of Oil Abundance (Latitude, 
Specification 2, Table 7) 
 
Note: Marginal effects based on specification 2 of Table 7. All other regressors at their mean values. 
Appendix 1: Pairwise Correlations for the Joint Sample of Reporting and Non-Reporting Countries 
 
Gini Log 
Income  
Latitude  Land 
locked 
Oil 
rents 
Oil 
rents pc 
Oil 
reserves pc 
Institutions Agriculture Fractionalisation Openness Rep. 
behav. 
Data 
Rep. 
Index 
Gini 1             
Log Income  -0.49 1            
Latitude  -0.62 0.65 1           
Landlocked 0.11 -0.31 -0.09 1          
Oil rents 0.1 0.13 -0.12 -0.17 1         
Oil rents pc -0.13 0.26 0.06 -0.09 0.49 1        
Oil reserves pc -0.17 0.32 0.08 -0.13 0.54 0.72 1       
Institutions -0.33 0.44 0.38 -0.12 -0.29 -0.13 -0.27 1      
Agriculture -0.3 -0.04 0.22 0.01 -0.24 -0.15 -0.23 0.15 1     
Fractionalisation 0.44 -0.49 -0.56 0.14 0.09 -0.05 -0.09 -0.27 -0.23 1    
Openness -0.03 0.22 0 -0.02 0.12 0.12 0.16 -0.01 -0.21 -0.16 1   
Reporting 
behaviour 
-0.4 0.6 0.47 -0.23 -0.19 -0.06 -0.1 0.56 0.16 -0.32 -0.03 1  
Data 
reporting 
index 
0.02 0.18 0.13 -0.14 -0.1 -0.07 -0.13 0.08 0.09 -0.05 -0.19 0.22 1 
Note: A detailed description of all variables is provided in Table 1. Note: This table is based on the observations included in specification (6) of Table 2. 
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Appendix 2: Pairwise Correlations for the Sample of Reporting Countries 
 
Gini Log 
Income  
Latitude  Land 
locked 
Oil 
rents 
Oil rents 
pc 
Oil 
reserves pc 
Institutions Agriculture Fractionalisation Openness Rep. 
behav. 
Data Rep. 
Index 
Gini 1             
Log Income  -0.67 1            
Latitude  -0.75 0.65 1           
Landlocked -0.07 0 0.12 1          
Oil rents 0.14 -0.18 -0.28 -0.12 1         
Oil rents pc -0.16 0.2 0.16 -0.07 0.4 1        
Oil reserves pc -0.18 0.23 0.15 -0.09 0.51 0.8 1       
Institutions -0.38 0.58 0.42 -0.02 -0.15 0.11 0.13 1      
Agriculture -0.34 -0.06 0.27 0.07 -0.1 -0.12 -0.21 0.06 1     
Fractionalisation 0.58 -0.53 -0.58 0.01 0.35 -0.06 -0.09 -0.38 -0.23 1    
Openness -0.14 0.18 0 0.17 -0.02 0.06 0.09 -0.07 -0.1 -0.2 1   
Reporting 
behaviour 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a  
Data 
reporting 
index 
0.09 -0.18 -0.16 -0.06 0 -0.1 -0.13 -0.17 -0.06 0.13 -0.23 n/a 1 
Note: A detailed description of all variables is provided in Table 1. Note: This table is based on the observations included in specification (6) of Table 2. 
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Appendix 3: Observations and Mean Values per Country 
Country Freq. % Net 
Gini 
Oil rents Oil rents 
pc 
Oil 
reserves pc 
Argentina 24 1.8 43 3.40 0.14 0.06 
Australia 29 3.9 30 1.47 0.26 0.26 
Austria 26 5.9 27 0.20 0.04 0.01 
Bangladesh 19 7.3 37 0.79 0.00 0.00 
Belgium 9 7.9 26 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Brazil 24 9.7 51 0.83 0.02 0.05 
Canada 29 11.9 29 2.28 0.43 0.38 
Chile 24 13.6 50 0.59 0.02 0.01 
China 24 15.4 41 4.24 0.02 0.02 
Colombia 24 17.2 49 3.98 0.06 0.09 
Costa Rica 24 19.0 42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Denmark 29 21.1 24 0.58 0.11 0.30 
Dominican Republic 23 22.8 45 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ecuador 23 24.6 49 7.70 0.12 0.45 
Finland 29 26.7 23 0.00 0.00 0.00 
France 29 28.9 29 0.06 0.01 0.00 
Gambia 12 29.7 53 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Germany 20 31.2 27 0.08 0.01 0.00 
Greece 28 33.3 33 0.10 0.01 0.00 
Guatemala 22 34.9 51 0.31 0.00 0.02 
Honduras 21 36.5 50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hungary 29 38.6 27 1.61 0.05 0.03 
India 24 40.4 49 1.47 0.01 0.01 
Indonesia 24 42.2 46 7.51 0.06 0.03 
Ireland 29 44.4 32 0.22 0.02 0.00 
Israel 29 46.5 33 0.10 0.01 0.00 
Italy 29 48.7 32 0.16 0.02 0.01 
Japan 29 50.8 27 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Kenya 22 52.4 49 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Korean Republic 29 54.6 33 0.09 0.00 0.00 
Note: This table is based on the observations included in specification (6) of Table 
2. 
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Appendix 3 (cont.): Observations and Mean Values per Country 
Country Freq. % Net 
Gini 
Oil rents Oil rents 
pc 
Oil 
reserves pc 
Malaysia 23 56.3 47 7.00 0.16 0.29 
Mauritius 24 58.1 18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mexico 24 59.9 46 5.34 0.20 0.32 
Morocco 23 61.6 37 0.04 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 29 63.7 25 1.57 0.29 0.01 
New Zealand 29 65.9 31 0.30 0.03 0.08 
Nicaragua 17 67.1 49 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nigeria 24 68.9 47 25.03 0.11 0.31 
Norway 29 71.1 24 7.69 1.85 4.25 
Panama 24 72.8 50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Paraguay 9 73.5 50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Peru 24 75.3 52 3.14 0.06 0.04 
Poland 13 76.3 30 0.16 0.00 0.00 
Portugal 29 78.4 31 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Singapore 29 80.6 42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
South Africa 24 82.3 55 0.90 0.03 0.00 
Spain 29 84.5 32 0.08 0.01 0.00 
Sweden 29 86.6 22 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Switzerland 29 88.8 30 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
21 90.4 37 19.26 1.28 0.92 
United Kingdom 29 92.5 32 1.95 0.29 0.13 
United States 29 94.7 35 1.35 0.34 0.10 
Uruguay 24 96.4 43 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Venezuela 24 98.2 41 17.84 0.76 1.96 
Zambia 24 100.0 55 0.07 0.00 0.00 
Note: This table is based on the observations included in specification (6) of Table 
2. 
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Appendix 4: Table 2 Re-estimated Using Fixed Effects 
TABLE A1. Effects of Oil Dependence on Net Income Inequality (Fixed Effects) 
Dependent variable:  Gini 
(1) 
Gini 
(2) 
Gini 
(3) 
Gini 
(4) 
Gini 
(5) 
Log Income  
5.193** 
(2.275) 
4.954** 
(2.064) 
5.543** 
(2.247) 
5.128* 
(2.945) 
5.092* 
(2.991) 
Oil rents 
 
-0.223** 
(0.087) 
-0.468** 
(0.289) 
-0.453** 
(0.181) 
-0.910*** 
(0.205) 
-0.896** 
(0.316) 
Oil rents (sq) 
 
 0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.005* 
(0.03) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
Institutions 
 
  0.063 
(0.133) 
0.059 
(0.152) 
     0.057 
(0.147) 
Agriculture 
   -0.306** 
(0.122) 
-0.301** 
(0.139) 
Trade Openness 
 
    0.923 
(1.374) 
R 2 adjusted 0.203 0.198 0.213 0.258 0.260 
N 1935 1935 1592 1348 1348 
Countries 81 81 75 55 55 
Note: Robust standard errors of coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 
and 1% level of significance. Year dummies included in all specifications. A detailed description of all 
variables is provided in Table 1.  
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Appendix 5: Conditional Marginal Effects for Heckman Selection Models 
The following is a general formula for the conditional marginal effect in the Heckman Selection 
Model (see Frondel and Vance, 2009), where 𝑥1 is the variable for which the marginal effect is 
calculated. This formula is general in the sense that it can also be used to calculate the marginal effect 
even under the presence of an interaction term, such as 𝑥1𝑥2. When there is no interaction term, this 
formula reverts to the simple marginal effect because 𝛽12 = 𝜏12 = 0. 
 
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑥1
= (𝛽1 + 𝛽12𝑥2) +  𝛽𝜆 . 𝛿(𝑢1) ∙ (𝜏1 + 𝜏12𝑥2), (A.1) 
where 
𝑢1 = ?̂?1𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎_𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?2𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖(𝑡−5) + ?̂?3
′ 𝒁𝑖𝑡, and 
𝛿(𝑢1) =  𝜆
′(𝑢1) =  
−𝑢1𝜙(𝑢1)Φ(𝑢1) − 𝜙
2(𝑢1)
Φ2(𝑢1)
=  −[𝜆(𝑢1)]
2 − 𝑢1 ∙ 𝜆 (𝑢1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
